In this paper, a system for P2P networks with discrete time delay based on game theory presented. This system is proposed to describe evolution procedure of the credibility of various members in the P2P network . 
Introduction
In 1994, Marsh first systematically discussed the formalization of the trust. He classified the contents of trust and the degree of trust from the view of the trusty concept. In addition, he also proposed a trust evaluation mathematical model based on the subjectivity of trusty. Subsequently, Adul. Rah man and others set up an evaluation model of the trust degree based on distributed feedback informat ion [1] [2] [3] . After that, In accordance with the problems in trust description, many scholars put forward different trust management models under P2P environ ment with respective view [4] [5] [6] [7] .
With the development and wide use of P2P technology, the trust and security problems in P2P network are increasingly serious [8] [9] [10] . i.e. the person we are co mmunicating with is whether the right person we thought he was ,as well as the resources we are visiting are whether the resources we needed. In order to solve the trust problem in P2P network, the system members must be granted the trust degree to guarantee the Quality of Serv ice (QoS) [11] . In a d istributed P2P applicat ion, the trust degree is measured by well-defined criteria.
In paper [12] , based on game theory, the authors presented a simplified mathemat ical model to describe the P2P network's trustworthiness evolution question. The members in the P2P network were classfied as service providers and service consumers. The relat ionship between the provider and consumer respect to trust is described as in Fig 1 . Fig 1 shows how provider and consumers interact in a basic services g ame. Let us now assume that the trust game between provider and consumer p layed repeatedly: the provider can be trust and provide good service 0 < < 1 or not 0 < 1 − < 1. Then, in case of trust, the consumers must either leave an honest feedback 0 < 1 < 1 or a dishonest feedback 0 < 1 − 1 < 1 . And in not trust case, the consumer must either an honest feedback 0 < 2 < 1 or a dishonest feedback 0 < 1 − 2 < 1. And, , 1 , 2 all are the function of time .
In each period of time , each of an infin ite nu mber of peers can assume both the role of a provider or that of a consumer, and they are randomly matched to play the game. Over time, the basic games are lin ked via reputation informat ion , of each provider, where stands for "bad" and for "good" reputation. In particular, the reputation r in period + 1 is given by the following rule +1 = + , (1.1) So, in this game, the payoff function is related to the reputation of peer. As shown in the Fig 1, without explicit ly modeling the decision of a consumer whether to trust the provider, we imp licit ly assume that a provider with a bad reputation is never trusted and thus receives zero payoffs in the current and all future periods. Providers with a good reputation, on the other hand, can always be certain to be trusted. This imp lies that the feedback mechanism o ffered by the game platform.
As shown in Fig 1, in the games, when the nu mber of service providers and service users is certain, the specific amount of , 1 , 2 , will also has an upper limit. So we can assume that , 1 , 2 , have competitive relationship and they are always co mpete for the total quantity space. We assume 1 , 2 , 3 are the maximu m credibility of , 1 , 2 , respectively, and the differences among 1 , 2 , 3 and , 1 ， 2 be denoted as the extra amount that the credibility can grow.
The model in the paper carries some convenience to promote o ur understanding to trust evolution of every peer in P2P network, which has also taken congestion impact into consideration with some illustration of numerical examp les.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 introduces the related work. Selec tion 2 is our trust model. Section 3 gives the analysis on stability of the model. Particu lar examp les are shown in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the model, and possibilities for further research .
Trust Model
The purpose of this paper is to describe the development procedure of the credibility of various peers in the P2P network with an id iographic differential equation. As shown in figure 1 in the term o f game theory, we give the corresponding restriction to the evolution proced ure. We don't wholly decide evolution procedure of the credibility, but we do in every time t based on quality of service in the course. We divide the members into 3 groups, service providers, honest feedback peers and dishonest feedback peers. This is just like the 3 groups of population in biology and the number of the peers is like their life space which they always struggle with each other. This imp lies that we can use biological mathematics to describe evolution procedure of the credibility.
In the literature [13] , the author has developed an improved model based on Lotka-Volterra model with an objective description for competit ion between indifferent species, which describes the phenomenon that the species with similar requirements for space and resou rces are directly orindirectly suppressed by each other. The situation described in literature [10] is very close to the phenomenon described in L-V model, because for service providers, it is only possible to provide a good or bad service, wh ich we can consider the case of providing the two services are always against each other, and they are always competitive with each other. So we establish a model based on L-V model.
But, due to the congestion or other reasons, the timely feedback for service quality cannot be guaranteed. So, we create a t rust model for t rust evolution in which time delayed feedback are considered.
In the L-V model, the main model parameters are the populations of two species, carrying capacity, population growth rate, which is very close to evolution of the trust we have described above. We use the maximu m t rust, trust growth rate to construct model, where the value of trust is limited within 0,1 , so the trust model with two parameters based on L-V model can be deduced.
Where, is the credib ility of service provider, 1 is the credibility of the honest feedback member and 2 is the credibility of d ishonest feedback member. is the time delay. ( ) and ( ) are feedback functions to the service. 1 1 , 2 , 3 , , , take some values which not meet real conditions. So the value of , 1 , 2 will take the ( ) value as their final credibility to bound their value range.
Stability Analyses
The system Again, for convenience, we study In the case that 2 < 2 , only 0 ,1 need to be considered, since if system(2.1) is asymptotically stable up to 0,1 , and is it unstable thereafter.
In the case that 2 > 2 , if system(2.1) is stable for = 0, then it must follo w that 0,1 < 0,2 . We observe that
Therefore, there can be only a fin ite number of switches between stability and instability. Moreover, it is easy to see there exist a value of , such that at = a stability switch occurs fro m stable to unstable , and for > the solution remain unstable. If system (2.1) is unstable for = 0, System (2.1) can either be unstable for > 0, or any nu mber of stability switches as in the preceding case.
When the zero solution is stable for = 0, k switches fro m stability to instability may occur when the parameters are such that 0,1 < 0,2 < 1 ,1 … < −1,1 < −1,2 < ,1 < ⋯ (3.13)
Or switches fro m stability to instability may occur when 0,2 < 0,1 < 1 ,2 … < −1,3 < −1,1 < ,2 < ⋯ (3.14)
When ± = ± and + > − , ( ) < 0 or ( ) > 0, there will exist Hopf bifurcation in th is system. We can summarize the preceding results as the following theorem.
Theorem 1
In system (2.1), assume 2 = 3 = , = = . The number of different imaginary roots with positive imaginary parts of (3.5) can be zero, one or two.
(1) If there are no such roots, then the stability of the zero solution does not change for any ≥ 0.
(2) If there is one imaginary root with positive imaginary part, an unstable zero solution never becomes stable for any ≥ 0. If the zero solution is asymptotically stable for = 0 , then it is uniformly asymptotically stable for < 0,1 , and it becomes unstable for > 0,1 . If there are t wo imaginary roots with positive imaginary part + and − , such that + > − > 0, then the stability of the zero solution can change a finite number of t imes at most as is increased.
The general case: ≠ , ≠ in (3.4)
In this part we consider the general case, i. 
Numerical Examples
In this section, we will test the specific value in the system (2.1), with the following foundation t hat credibility is supposed to be with maximu m value 0.9, 0.85, 0.85, respectively, the values of service parameter is 0.75 and 0.25, we can get the results in the In the Fig 2, we can deduce a conclusion that the system (2.1) is stable with short time delay and other given system parameters, which is accord with the actual situation. We can interpret it with the following detail that when the time delay is short, it means the services user always get the feedback rapidly after using the services, then service's provider and user of cred ibility will get balanced rapid ly. So we can use the current credibility to measure if they are trusted or no t.
In the Fig 3, we can conclude that when the delay is longer than a value, the system (2.1) is unstable. This testifies the conclusion that we probed in this paper and also fitted the actual situation. When the time is too long, it means the service user have not feedback rapidly or no feedback, so we cannot estimate their credib ility in these case.
Conclusions
In this paper, we describe the evolution of the credibility in the P2P network by a specific differential equation. With theoretical analy zing and simu lation results, we can conclude that rapid feedback is the key factor for the balance of credibility by discussion of the equation' s stability and instance of the specific value. When the time delay is short, the user's credibility can be restored to stable state rapidly. On this occasion, we can use the credibility to judge the trust of the user, the defect of our study lies in the limitation that, it is difficult to reach the stable state and we cannot judge the trust of the user. The research results of this paper can be considered to guide our work in controlling congestion of network.
